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CHAPTER 5
Politics of Neutrality, Human Rights 
and Armed Struggles: The Turkey Example
Ozan Kamiloglu
INTRODUCTION: HEGEMONY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCOURSES AND LOSS OF ALTERNATIVES
This chapter concentrates on debates that started during 1993 in the Insan 
Haklari Dernegi1 (IHD—Human Rights Association) of Turkey regarding 
the adoption of the extended mandate of Amnesty International (AI) that 
came out after the 20th International Council Meeting in Yokohama, 
Japan (referred as Yokohama declaration throughout the debates),2 and 
still resonates with many current issues in human rights. By looking at discus-
sions within a local actor (the IHD) surrounding this declaration, which 
expanded AI’s mandate to include work on abuses by armed opposition 
groups (as well as by the State), this chapter aims to track the appropria-
tion, interpretation and resistance to human rights discourses of AI and 
other international NGOs. This analysis shows that the debates reflect the 
broader historical and political context of the immediate aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. It is in this very specific context that the 
discourses by organizations categorized as “leftist” lost their moral ground 
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for emancipatory politics, and turned instead to an emphasis on rights 
protection. Thus, the debates within the IHD, triggered by the Yokohama 
declaration, can be read as a search for a language that can accommodate 
both, on the one side, the revolutionary ideals and grammar of its partici-
pants and, on the other, the depoliticized nature of human rights work in 
the climate of the 1990s. I argue in this chapter that this endeavor to 
accommodate often conflicting discourses is the very characteristic of the 
contemporary politics of human rights: a constant translation and appro-
priation of its global discourses by local narratives of resistance, and the 
limitations of this translation after the end of Cold War.3 As such, Hopgood 
(2013, p. 178) reminds us about the neo- Westphalian world in which the 
Human Rights (uppercase) of the West lacks coherence, but where “low-
ercase human rights, a non-hegemonic language of resistance allied to a 
variety of causes and motivations” appears to be still operative. Likewise, 
Upendra Baxi (2006, p. 23) highlights the plurality of human rights made 
up of “resistances and struggles” against the “dominant and hegemonic” 
position assumed by a quasi-religious and “universal” human rights. These 
two different understandings of human rights do not constitute autono-
mous spaces, but are rather the two sides of a hegemonic struggle, and 
translations, adoptions, and changes in the meaning of human rights in 
different time and space is a part of this struggle.
In this respect, this chapter argues that the expansion of the human 
rights discourses during the 1980s and 1990s from a more ‘state-centric’ 
approach to monitoring armed opposition and searching for justice for 
victims is a symptom of what French philosopher Jacques Rancière (2006) 
calls ‘the ethical turn of aesthetics and politics’ in the article with the same 
name. The debate within IHD reveals that the loss of the political goes 
side by side with a turn to victims for the political opposition, so that the 
various discursive encounters within the left over which path to take for 
emancipation are transformed into debates as to which forms and kinds of 
violence to be in favor of or against. This turn eventually led to a discus-
sion over the grammar and language of human rights—which includes the 
meanings of violence, rights, neutrality, and so on—that inevitably carries 
the legacy of the grammar and language used in the past by revolutionary 
actors. These debates that divide revolutionary activists over the scope of 
human rights activism reflect, on the one hand, what Foucault (1988) calls 
the “modern rationality,” which in its extreme leads to loss of the political, 
and, on the other, an attempt to imagine possible different futures through 




There is a relatively rich literature on the relations between human 
rights discourses and Western powers, which also considers de- 
politicization, or loss of utopias.4 Also the literature on appropriation, 
translation and invention of human rights ideals by the ‘Third World’ has 
gained volume in recent years.5 By focusing on an NGO from Turkey, this 
chapter highlights the dynamism in human rights discourses between the 
universal and the particular. Human rights discourses are informed by past 
experiences of local actors and global powers; they are at the same time 
specifically situated in time and place while still being informed by timeless 
universal ideas. The article shows that human rights discourses lose their 
emancipatory potential if they lose their connection to the circumstances 
of the violation, instead of either focusing on the instant of (bodily) harm 
or resorting to a vague and abstract universal language. These two alterna-
tives are eventually correlated and inevitably entail de-politicization of 
human rights discourses.
The first section of the chapter will provide a background to the 
debates by presenting the history of the IHD and the impact of Amnesty 
International’s Yokohama declaration in relation to that particular his-
tory. The second section will focus on the debate that took place in the 
bulletin of the organization: it shows how some of the arguments reflect 
the Foucauldian “modern rationality” and advocate for an expansion of 
human rights activism, while others resist this rationality in different 
ways by using the revolutionary lexicon. The third section theoretically 
analyzes this opposition. On the one side, the modern rationality in its 
extreme form leads to a de-politicization of humanitarian activism, 
mainly by equating the violation of human rights with bodily harm; on 
the other side, the human rights grammar and meaning of words are 
appropriated and embedded into a revolutionary language to resist this 
de-politicization.
BACKGROUND OF THE YOKOHAMA DECLARATION: 
HISTORY, CONTEXT AND DEBATES
The Global Context
The AI’s press release following the meeting in Yokohama, Japan in 1991 
states that6:
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Perhaps the most far-reaching decision taken in Yokohama was to expand 
Amnesty International’s mandate in relation to abuses committed by oppo-
sition groups. Amnesty International has for many years condemned the 
torture or killing of prisoners held by opposition groups. It will now addi-
tionally oppose other deliberate and arbitrary killings and hostage-taking by 
armed political opposition groups. […] Amnesty International opposes 
deliberate and arbitrary killings whether the victims are assassinated indi-
vidually or are killed in indiscriminate attacks.
Furthermore, AI lists (1992) in the first report published after the 
Yokohama meeting, a wide range of examples of such abuses by armed 
political opposition groups, such as FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia), ELN (National Liberation Army), Sendero Luminoso 
(Shining Path) of Peru, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). With this declaration, AI stepped into 
humanitarian action not only against states but also against armed opposi-
tion groups through the concept of “deliberate and arbitrary killings and 
hostage-taking” (Baehr 1994). In addition to the Geneva Convention, 
customary rules of international humanitarian law by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and several UN Security Council 
resolutions as well as other statements by UN bodies provided a legal 
framework that made armed groups potentially responsible for human 
rights abuses (Clapham 2006; Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan 2009; Dudai 
and McEvoy 2012). Yet, this extension of AI’s mandate, together with a 
similar turn in Human Rights Watch’s approach during the 1980s 
(Goldman 1993), sparked a fundamental discussion among various local 
human rights groups around the world over the question of violence and 
especially minorities’ right to protect themselves from their oppressors, as 
well as how human rights should be defined (Dudai and McEvoy 2012). 
In order to understand the discussion that took place in the Turkish con-
text, a brief overview of the history of the IHD is needed to explain where 
the association stands historically in the Turkish political landscape.
IHD and the Turkish Context
After the introduction of multi-party elections in 1950, Turkey witnessed 
three coups: in 1960, 1971, and 1980. During the last coup, the most 




systematically tortured and killed by security forces.7 Prisoners responded 
to systematic torture with, among other tactics, hunger strikes, resulting 
in multiple deaths. After the official end of the coup in November 1983, 
the Turkish state imposed compulsory prison uniforms, which triggered a 
wider wave of hunger strikes in 1984 and 1985, predominantly in 
Diyarbakir, Mamak, Sagmacilar, and Metris prisons (Bargu 2014, p. 181), 
probably inspired by the 1981 hunger strikes of IRA and INLA (Irish 
National Liberation Army) prisoners.8 Prisoners’ hunger strike and follow-
ing fasting unto death led to the founding of the Solidarity Association for 
the Families and Relatives of the Arrested (TAYAD).9 Nevertheless, the 
activities of the group have been suppressed; members have been detained, 
and harassed by police.10 Still, they managed to mobilize wider parts of 
society, which was a factor in the partial success of hunger strikes in pris-
ons: prison clothing was abolished as a result of the continuous struggle of 
the prisoners and their families. It is important to emphasize the struggle 
of TAYAD in order to understand the political situation of the country 
during the years when IHD was founded. IHD is probably today the most 
important human rights NGO in Turkey, despite the repression it has 
been subject to. In particular, 23 members have been assassinated, many 
others faced long sentences, local branches have been closed, and the 
NGO itself has been demonized by the mainstream media as the common 
enemy of people during the intense war against the PKK. The main goals 
of the association are: monitoring human rights violations, preparation of 
reports about them, and transmission of its findings to the general public. 
Hüsnü Öndül, head of IHD, defines the IHD as an organization with 
more “general aims” than TAYAD.11 According to one of the early activ-
ists of IHD, the lawyer Ercan Kanar (1997, p. 5), TAYAD was lacking an 
outlook based on the universality and indivisibility of human rights, and 
was not concerned with mobilizing norms on human rights. IHD stated 
that it had been founded as a response to the state violence of the 1980 
coup.12 It is therefore possible to assert that IHD was founded as a 
 collaboration of prisoners’ families and leftist intellectuals and lawyers of 
the time, as a response to abuses in prisons and widespread torture, and 
then evolved into a human rights NGO with wider interests. This is the 
distinctive character of the association: instead of starting with a predeter-
mined human rights agenda and set values and strategies, the association 
was from the beginning open to discussion over the meanings of human 
rights. It was a collaboration between grassroots organizations and those 
who had been subject to violations themselves and those who can use the 
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language of human rights that has been widely accepted in the West, such 
as lawyers and intellectuals.
The 1991 decision of AI to condemn the abuses of armed political 
organizations led to turmoil in IHD. Members disagreed over the neces-
sity to adopt AI’s position, and the bulletin of the association became the 
cornerstone of arguments from both sides, which often turned into a dis-
cussion over the meaning of human rights.13 What is common in all these 
debates was (1) the projection and construction of the neutrality claim of 
the Western human rights discourses14; (2) a linear construction of time 
and development that flows through and from the West; and (3) the ethi-
cization of the political through universal notions such as individual free-
dom structured by the West. These debates illustrate how the language of 
human rights is constantly appropriated, translated, and performed. 
According to Nicola Perugini and Neve Gordon (2015), the politics of 
human rights is thus a struggle over different forms of interpretation and 
translation of their meaning, and it is fundamental to think about how dif-
ferent actors interpret the human rights grammar in their worldviews and 
how these in turn are informed by this translation. Thus, the meaning of 
human rights activism is, on the one hand, situated in a particular place 
and time and, on the other hand, relational to the universal notions 
invented by the West that inform human rights movements. It is the ten-
sion between these two aspects that puts human rights discourses at the 
same time into the grammar of resistance movements, the lowercase 
human rights discourses, and into the discourses of the power holders, the 
uppercase Human Rights. The debates within the IHD, where the ques-
tion of violence became the focal point, reflected this dynamic of human 
rights. In this particular case, the principle that requires all forms of vio-
lence to be condemned by human rights organizations was challenged, 
mainly because of the distinctive revolutionary experiences of the organi-
zation and its activists.
YOKOHAMA DEBATES IN THE IHD
The Yokohama Declaration was published in the bulletin of the associa-
tion for the first time in March 1993, which launched the discussions.15 
Following the years after the hunger strikes (1992–1994), IHD was trying 




the right to free speech, the right to fair trial, and the right to life. Thus, 
the Yokohama discussions should be read in parallel with this search of 
universal norms within the association. For example, Ercan Kanar (1994, 
p. 28), the head of the IHD Istanbul branch and a well-known human 
rights lawyer, wrote mostly in favor of “overcoming the dogmas of the 
1970s” and embodying a human rights culture in the country.16 His argu-
ments are supported in articles published the same year by others, such as 
the head of Izmir branch, Yesim Islegen. Kanar (1994, p. 28) summarizes 
different positions in the debate over Yokohama Declaration:
According to one approach, only the violations of states should be targeted 
[by IHD]. The second approach does not underestimate the violations of 
alternative power structures, but still mainly targets the State. A third one 
does not make any distinction between the state and the opposition; and as 
a demonstration of neutrality, speaks only of the violation itself.
For him, human rights struggles seek to build a tradition and culture of 
human rights: “Would it be possible to build a culture and tradition of 
human rights, if we close our eyes to atrocities of the opposition?” (Kanar 
1994, p. 28). In this line of argument, the insistence over the subject of 
human rights is striking: the focus should be the violation itself, instead of 
the actors in the conflict, their role in the human rights violation and their 
relative power. In the context of the Yokohama declaration, what is being 
discussed as violations is killing, given that AI explicitly underlines deliber-
ate and arbitrary killings and hostage-taking by armed political opposition 
groups. Kanar (1993, p. 34) also makes reference to other forms of bodily 
violence such as torture, capital punishment, and assassinations. What 
Kanar highlights as the culture and tradition of human rights is very much 
informed by the human rights discourses in the West and subsequent 
adoptions of these discourses by the local activists. Kanar insists upon the 
need to “find universality in the human rights struggle” (1994, p. 28), and 
considers international agreements and treaties as triumphs to follow. He 
is clear about it: “In the way strike actions are being followed by labor 
agreements, and it is impossible to undermine the importance of them, 
one has to consider international agreements in this manner” (1994, 
p. 28). Thus, for him, these agreements have to be followed. His perspec-
tive orientated the struggle toward what he calls “free individual, free soci-
ety,” through the universal principles and international agreements, which 
originated in the West. The rationale for this position can perhaps be 
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reduced to this scheme: the universality of human rights, which can form a 
tradition and culture of human rights, is possible only by showing neutral-
ity, and the only way of being neutral is to focus on the suffering of the 
victims. For him, this is the way to change Turkish society for the better, 
which he encapsulates under the motto of “free individual, free society.”17 
Likewise, Yeşim Islegen (1993, p. 40) argues that “the human rights cul-
ture is not developed enough in our country” and for a better-developed 
human rights culture, “we need proportionality, neutrality and  transparency, 
and a human right understanding that does not change with daily poli-
tics.” In both of the arguments, the notion of development emerges as a 
motive of human rights struggle, which inevitably sees Western societies as 
an example of what human right struggles should aim for.
It would be a mistake to consider the position that underlines the need 
to embrace the international standards as a liberal one. Instead, it is argu-
ably a very modern one. The arguments of Kanar and Işlegen are very 
much in line with what Foucault (1988, p. 161) called the “modern ratio-
nality.” Foucault (1988, p. 161) reminded us that
the main characteristic of our modern rationality in this perspective is nei-
ther the constitution of the state, the coldest of all cold monsters, nor the 
rise of bourgeois individualism. […] I think that the main characteristic of 
modern political rationality is the fact that this integration of the individuals 
in a community or in a totality results from a constant correlation between 
an increasing individualization and the reinforcement of this totality.
Therefore, focusing on the violation itself, as Kanar and others advocated, 
led to the individualization and criminalization of historical injustices, by 
reducing them to acts of victims and perpetrators. It also led to the rein-
forcement of human rights as totality, through the notion of the human, 
our shared totality. The Western human rights discourses are thus about 
the creation of a culture of human rights (totality) and victimization (indi-
vidualization). Focusing on Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, Bal Sokhi-Bulley (2016) shows how “the policing technologies are 
represented by the criteria they must satisfy in order to secure their status 
as ‘suitable’ participants to rights discourse” in order to secure attendance 
at the UN and ECOSOC (The United Nations Economic and Social 
Council) meetings: that is to be visible and countable. This is, according 
to Sokhi-Bulley (2016), the policing of International NGOs and humani-




However, what we see in the IHD case is the other face of the human 
rights discourses: they are not only a policing tool, but also an ideological 
one, whose mechanisms are much more complex than traceable relations 
of power. Thus, there are different ways of looking at the structure of 
human rights movements: the first one is the genealogy of dependency 
through the power relations of the West and the rest (technologies of 
power). The IHD, for example, does not receive any fund from the UN or 
other international bodies as a principle. The other one, which is even 
harder to spot and resist, is how the logic of modernity emanating from 
Western institutions became the blueprint for thinking about politics 
(political technology of individuals). What Foucault called modern ratio-
nality appropriates its totality (universal principles) and also its individual 
(individual harm as defined by international agreements and conventions). 
The more individuals’ rights are violated, the more the totality calls for 
judgment. However, Foucault (1988) does not mention explicitly in “The 
Political Technology of Individuals” how modern rationality is actually 
also a Western rationality, which has been adopted by the rest, often in 
conflict with the history and social and economic dynamics of the society. 
It is a very complex articulation of power that the human rights discourses 
of non-Western countries resist, adopt, and translate.
In another essay published in the bulletin of IHD, Ercan Kanar (1993, 
p. 34) asks for example, “How are you planning to go to further levels if 
you don’t win the people on the street, give them trust, and show a prin-
cipled decisiveness?” Thus, in connection with the point made earlier 
about “creating a culture of human rights,” the adoption of the Yokohama 
Declaration would help the IHD to a principled decisiveness, a claim for 
neutrality, and would allow it to bring citizens to a consciousness of human 
rights. A linear time line of events is, thus, structured from backwardness 
to development.18 This narrative of backwardness and human rights as the 
means to reach further levels is in line with the Matau Mutua’s (2001) 
terminology of Savages/Victims/Saviors which positions human rights 
NGOs as Saviors. Further levels in this respect, can be reached only if IHD 
takes a position against the abuses of the armed opposition forces. Only in 
this way can it show the “principled decisiveness” which is possible in a 
position of neutrality, that is, by acting against both parties in a conflict, 
regardless of the circumstances. It is interesting to observe how a radical 
lawyer like Kanar reaches what is known as the hydraulic model of human 
rights, that associates more rights with less domination. In this classic lin-
ear model of human rights that can be found in human rights textbooks, 
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global salvation and redemption is achieved through human rights. It is 
again apparent how Foucault’s modern rationality operates: total salvation 
is only possible with individual rights, thus, “free individual, free society.” 
The correlation between an increasing individualization and the reinforce-
ment of totality is also visible in the instant of the individual harm and the 
utopian ahistorical totality. As the time becomes instantaneous, focuses on 
the suffering of the victim and the urgency of the protection of rights at 
an instant, it becomes simultaneously ahistorical and universal. Human 
rights embody this tension as a modern political discourse, which demands 
action because of the urgency to stop the suffering, and concurrently 
demands an absolute belief in its ahistoricity, therefore its unquestionable 
universal truth. The correlation between the universality claim and the 
urgency of the harm, to an extent, explains also why the social and eco-
nomic rights are never seen as urgently requiring action, and thus never 
able to summon a corresponding accepted universal.
The line of arguments Kanar, Isgoren, and others advocated for has 
been responded to by a more radical branch of IHD, most of whom define 
themselves as Marxists and even revolutionaries. The first argument against 
the adoption of AI’s position focuses on the word “arbitrary killings” used 
in the declaration. In one of the responses to Kanar and others, lawyer 
Levent Tuzel (1994, p. 25) invites them to look at what Yokohama decla-
ration exactly says:
It is obvious that no one would support arbitrary killings of civilians, torture 
or kidnappings. What constitutes an arbitrary killing will give rise to further 
discussions, since it is impossible to have a standard or criteria for this. 
Forget about declaring support for political actions, it seems it will be 
impossible to even stay silent for them. I would have accepted the declara-
tion if it was not all violent acts, but only the arbitrary ones that will be criti-
cised by AI, in struggles for rights and class wars. But when AI gives examples 
from countries like Turkey in this declaration, it is possible to find traces that 
arbitrariness is considered subjectively for the actions of armed militant 
organisations.
Tuzel emphasizes the notion of arbitrary since it is set as the standard of 
acceptability of the violence, according to Amnesty. In a similar manner, 




It is not possible to show a single human rights activist, who doesn’t raise his 
voice against arbitrary killings, torture or kidnapping. […] Why has AI 
come up with this lapalissade [tautology]? […] Apart from few criminal 
psychopaths who are the products of class society, is it possible to imagine 
someone committing such a crime [arbitrary killings]? Which criteria will 
decide on what is an arbitrary killing? […] Imperialists are holding all 
humanity as hostages with the system of paid slavery [labor markets], and 
colonialism. What if it is necessary to take some people hostage in order to 
stand against this taking of the masses as hostage? Are we supposed to say let 
humanity stay hostage?
These striking lines, which perhaps sound partisan to the ears of the 
Western human rights activists, clearly oppose the idea of defining an 
imaginary place built upon the term neutral. This is what international law 
has experienced, particularly in the context of the Geneva Convention 
(Clapham 2006). The convention underlines the proportionality of means 
to ends, namely physical suffering inflicted in modern warfare is acceptable 
as far as the ends it serves and the strategic advantage it brings, are worth 
it. Talal Asad (2003, p. 117) emphasizes, for example, this point, asking 
“how can the calculated cruelties of modern battle be reconciled with the 
modern sensibility regarding pain? Precisely by treating pain as a quantifi-
able essence.” In this respect, the arbitrariness of the violence as the stan-
dard of the Yokohama Declaration is an attempt to quantify the killings. 
As Asad (2003, p. 117) underlines, “Only necessary punishment of non- 
combatants should be used. But given the aim of ultimate victory the 
notion of “military necessity” can be extended indefinitely. Any measure 
that is intended as a contribution to that aim, no matter how much suffer-
ing it creates, may be justified in terms of military necessity.” In a similar 
manner, the violence of the armed organizations would fall into the cate-
gory of arbitrary since there cannot be any justification in the military or 
public sense that can justify the killing. Various commentators in the 
Yokohama debates warned of the danger of establishing a category of kill-
ings that can cover only the atrocities of the armed groups, as a conse-
quence of the structure of these conflicts.
These justifications are in close relation to the technological advance-
ment of the parties. Insurgent groups use relatively less controllable and 
less precise weapons compared to technologically advanced states:
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There is no question that technological asymmetry erodes the persuasive-
ness of the “all bound by the same rules” idea. It should not be surprising 
that forces with vastly superior arms and intelligence capacity are held to a 
higher standard in the court of world public opinion than their adversaries. 
As persuasion, the law in force has indeed become a sliding scale. (Kennedy 
2006, p. 139)
Particularly because of these technological advances, the division of vio-
lence as arbitrary and deliberate produces, as commentators in IHD 
highlight, an asymmetry also in the legitimation of the act in public and 
international law. Kennedy (2006, p. 139) adds that “by internalizing 
human rights and humanitarian law, you will make your force interoper-
able with international coalitions, suitable for international peacekeep-
ing missions. […] Most importantly, we insisted, humanitarian law will 
make your military more effective—will make your use of force some-
thing you can sustain and proudly stand behind.” This indicates another 
basis of the arguments of the party opposing the Yokohama declaration 
in IHD, which states that such an adoption would lead to positioning 
with the state. Furthermore, formation of such a category by Amnesty 
would also serve to categorize killing as civilized (which has an objec-
tive, a detailed and deliberate plan that can be seen by the international 
law) or barbarian (i.e. arbitrary and aimed at terrorizing the society) 
(Mbembe 2003).
Another important critique of the first position is related to the aims of 
the association, and more generally to the meaning of the human rights 
struggle. Levent Tüzel (1994, p. 25) continues in the same article:
Originally it was declared that the Association (IHD) was founded against 
the violations of rights by the state, that other rights violations were subject 
to trials by state courts, and security institutions were already fighting against 
those crimes; that is why there was no need for the association to condemn 
every instance of violence. […] In recent years, a new understanding of 
human rights, which takes sides with the “free individual and free society” is 
coming to prevail in our headquarters. In this understanding, everything is 
explained by human rightsism and it is argued that the utopic end of a free 
society is no longer relevant. A kind of denial of class society without deny-
ing the classes.
Tuzel argues that the aim of IHD should be documenting the violations 




or not being taken to the courts. According to him, the aim of IHD has 
always been to use international treaties and pressure or public opinion to 
counter abuse of power by state. What now makes IHD responsible for 
the violations of other armed groups? This is a significant question par-
ticularly in the context of a claim of neutrality. As we have seen, one part 
of the discussion highlighted the importance of neutrality since it is also a 
way to convince and win the trust of ordinary people and therefore to 
foster a human right culture among citizens. This is only possible by what 
Tuzel later in the article calls “taking sides with the state.” This example 
shows that to make the claim of neutrality is actually to get into a negotia-
tion about the meaning of human rights struggle for public acceptance of 
the association and the human rights culture in general. In this sense for 
Tuzel, there is a danger of having an NGO “taking sides with the state”: if 
they condemn the armed groups with human rights language, this would 
eventually legitimize the state itself. It would also mean that the state is 
taking sides with the respectable human rights discourses, next to the 
respected NGO. This is a concession for Tuzel, since those armed groups 
are already chased by the state forces, and any abuse they have committed 
is already documented by state institutions. Moreover, courts are also 
prosecuting them according to the criminal law of the state, mostly with 
the aggravated sentences attached to terrorism charges.19 Therefore, on 
the basis of this argument, the rationale behind the human rights NGOs 
that aim to protect individual rights against the State cannot be imported 
to the violations by armed groups. This argument demonstrates that the 
claim of neutrality is actually the very politics of rights struggles. Neutrality 
becomes the term for the de-politicization of this very political relation-
ship. In this particular context, neutrality means also to make the language 
of human rights available to states and thus to support their claims to 
legitimacy for their actions in the public and international arena.
Ayhan Erkin (1994, p. 24) also points in the same direction as Tuzel:
The world crushed socialism, now, it seems, the target is revolutionary move-
ments in the less developed countries. […] But how come Yokohama 
becomes an issue in the IHD? Here is why: 1) Since the human rights struggle 
is not being considered with a class perspective, which classes AI represents is 
obscure. 2) Not being able to look with the lens of class resonates with a 
‘beyond class’ approach. The AI’s approach that says, “we are against both 
this and that” goes together with the worry about falling into double stan-
dards. And eventually, the state and state supporting media’s side prevails. 3) 
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In the same way as the private law of bourgeoisie hides the property relations 
of the bourgeoisie, international norms and agreements hide the reign of the 
imperialists.
The claim of universality (beyond classes) and neutrality of human rights 
discourses hides the conflictual character of human rights behind the clar-
ity of meaning of neutrality. As Fitzpatrick (2014, p. 125) states, human 
rights “claim explicitly, and foundationally, an operative universality whilst 
being, and inevitably being, a particularity.” The universality and the par-
ticularity of human rights are interconnected by being ahistorical in uni-
versal principles but always urgent in the need to intervene. The argument 
Ayhan Erkin develops here is against the mainstream lexicon on human 
rights that “speak only of the violation itself”; in other words, uncovering 
instances of violation instead of structural underpinnings of the violent 
situation.
In an article from 1994, Özcan Sapan (p. 22), another activist lawyer 
from IHD, in relation to Yokohama declaration, asks the question,
Does Amnesty International think they are the Institute of Standardisation 
of Human Behaviours that decides what fits to it and what doesn’t? […] AI 
is interested not in the processes through which human becomes a victim, 
but the notion of victim itself. It can be said that it highlights the violence 
of opposition. […] It equates the violence of a local group with that of the 
State. […] If we push the reading of the Yokohama declaration a bit more, 
we face with this notion that is not directly in the text: Terrorist! […] 
Although it is not mentioned in the text, Amnesty International says ‘there 
is no just war’, and in this way it closes its eyes to institutions of the state like 
the judiciary, the police, interrogation centers, and prisons that take the 
shape of headquarters of dissuasion for those in opposition. It misses the fact 
that revolutionary violence is in the form of a self-defense against the state 
violence, although it seems to restrict itself with arbitrary violence for now.
The claim of neutrality and exclusive emphasis on the suffering caused by 
violations by the human rights lawyer inevitably avoids a more systematic 
critique. The use of violence becomes the only yardstick giving meanings 
to the political. This moving away from a structural critique, according to 
Perugini and Gordon (2015, p. 45), manifests itself as, “the constitution 
of the violation as a case and the appeal to the violating state to correct the 
violation, constitution of the violation as a routine to be administered in 




to a series of symptoms.” Özcan Sapan foresees the fact that this reduction 
would eventually create the use of the term terrorist for the combatants of 
armed movements.
BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR
While considering the particularities of the Turkish context, it is interest-
ing that both parties in these discussions turn to writings of Marx in order 
to justify their arguments. One can even say that peculiarly, the discussion 
over human rights and violence is translated into a discussion over differ-
ent Marxist interpretations throughout Yokohama debate, since both par-
ties are able to translate their arguments into a Marxist lexicon.
As some of the actors complain, the debate actually turns to a discus-
sion over utopias, and how to reach them. If human rights discourses 
claim to solve all problems of the world, they have to widen their territory 
of influence, and this is how ultimately the ethics of violence takes the 
place of the politics of violence. This is what Jacques Rancière discusses in 
his article “The Ethical Turn of Aesthetics and Politics” (2009). For 
Rancière, ethical turn “signifies the constitution of an indistinct sphere” 
which is the elimination of the distinction that separates moral judgments 
and politics; or, in other words, the elimination of the distinction between 
“what is and what ought to be.” Rancière refers to it as the distinction of 
fact and law. This creates, according to Rancière, the inclusion of “all 
forms of discourse and practice beneath the same indistinct point of view.” 
For Rancière (2009) the ethical turn is also the conjunction of two phe-
nomena: “On the one hand, the instance of judgment, which evaluates 
and decides, finds itself humbled by the compelling power of the law. On 
the other, the radicality of this law, which leaves no alternative, equates to 
the simple constraint of an order of things.” In parallel with what Foucault 
called the modern rationality that correlates more individual rights (i.e. 
more instantaneous, particularly in this context by focusing on the urgency 
of reacting to bodily violence) with founding of a community (humanity, 
nation), Rancière also underlines the moment of instantaneous judgment 
and the universal law. After the ethical turn, the moment of judgment 
becomes more instantaneous, and in this way, supports the totality, the 
law, that informs the judgment (and vice versa). Turning the rights viola-
tion into instantaneous bodily violence leaves less chance for alternatives, 
since it eventually takes its justification from the unquestionable universal 
law that it claims to reflect. This eventually leads to the labeling (with 
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labels such as terrorist) of those who are not within the reach of its univer-
sals, its law. As the human rights discourses expand the kinds of problems 
they can solve and consequently their reach, being outside of that border 
becomes even more dreadful, since the universal law that informs the dis-
course is even more absolute (in this case “you shall not kill”).
The discussions in the IHD of Turkey during 1990s carry the legacy of 
the line that has been inherited from the revolutionaries and the left of 
parliamentary politics in the Turkish political scene of 1970s. That line 
seems to be translated into the landscape of human rights discourses: while 
both parties are appropriating humanitarian approaches to limit the state 
power, one wants to keep the instance of judgment open to evaluation and 
decision by considering many different factors, and other calls on human 
rights law to solve “many problems of the world.” The Yokohama declara-
tion shows how human rights discourses expand their influence over poli-
tics. As Rancière (2004) states: “if those who suffer inhuman repression 
are unable to enact human rights that are their last recourse, then some-
body else has to inherit their rights in order to enact them in their place.” 
If this argument is considered in parallel with the claim of neutrality, the 
place of the neutral always belongs to an outside. This outside is a trouble-
some place, in which one has to look from the point of view of the victim. 
The neutral is in the outside, therefore, the adoption of AI’s position, 
simultaneously demands human rights activists to be outside the history 
they are part of, social and economic relations they are part of, inequalities 
they observe, and their ideas over the sources of violations. The neutrality 
claim inevitably demands of activists alienation from themselves. If IHL 
provides justification for Western states to “bring democracy” in the form 
of military interventions, concurrently it demands that human rights activ-
ists, in the rest of the world, step out of their own history that shaped their 
identity.20
Samuel Moyn (2012) calls human rights “the minimalist utopia of anti-
politics” in the times of its breakthrough, the late 1970s. In a similar man-
ner, Jacques Rancière (2004, p.  307) summarizes this dilemma neatly: 
“When [rights] are of no use, you do the same as charitable people do 
with their old clothes. You give them to the poor. These rights that appear 
to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with medicine and 
clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes, and rights. […] They 
become humanitarian rights, the rights of those who cannot enact them.” 
The debates over the adoption of Yokohama declaration in the IHD show 




discourses engage with them, transform them, and use them in different 
ways than their original intention. The poor, or those who need the pro-
tection of their basic rights, are not as passive as the uppercase human 
rights discourses imagine them. The debates in the IHD didn’t end up 
with the adoption of AI’s position but the contrary, IHD members refused 
to implement this position in their 1992 and 1994 meetings. In the same 
way, human rights discourses are strangled with the absolute law, that 
reflects the universals of the rulers, they also can affect those universals, by 
taking legitimacy from field work and risks, they can hold their positions, 
their past, and their respective ideologies, and consequently disrupt the 
moment of judgment. The past of the human rights defenders’ shared 
value systems and their imagined universals are sometimes not easy bedfel-
lows, and self-coherence is possible only with a critical interrogation of the 
given value systems. This indicates not the end of human rights, but many 
lives of human rights discourse.
CONCLUSION
In her book In Defence of the Terror Sophie Wahnich (2012, p. 48) asks 
“how could the agents of a public vengeance that led to the spilling of 
blood claim the sentiment of humanity?” She analyzes September 
Massacres during the French Revolution and highlights a conflict over 
human sentiments, between the sentiments of natural humanity and polit-
ical humanity, which also determined the political camps. One of these 
sentiments is (p. 52)
committed to saving bodies indifferently (those of friends, enemies, accom-
plices, traitors, slaves) so as not to injure its sentiment of natural humanity, 
was attached above all to the life of each human being as such, while other 
was attached to preserving the meaning a person wishes to give to life, to the 
common wellbeing.
If one of these sentiments that is driven by one set of universals is dedi-
cated to saving bare lives, the other sentiment is dedicated to protecting 
mutual liberty. Humanity thus is not any more a natural sentiment but a 
political one, not a descriptive one but a prescriptive one. Although not as 
sharp as this example, the debates in IHD is one of those times in which 
these two sentiments find themselves in a conflictual position. While one 
party demands an understanding of human rights taking into  consideration 
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the violation and victims, and aims to dream of a utopia which is born out 
of these individual rights, the other sees it as one of many struggles, and 
tries to combine those different struggles with the aim of mutual liberty. 
The ironic part in this picture is the way that the moral authority of human 
rights discourses that is gained through a history of protection of minori-
ties and individuals from state violence is easily converted to a violence/
non-violence—victims/perpetrators question. After the ethical turn, since 
the harm is reduced to that of instantaneous bodily harm, it is difficult to 
separate the law from the fact. The political motives behind the judgment 
are indistinguishable from the ethical ones, which are absolute. 
Revolutionary human rights defenders complicate this established under-
standing of rights and utopia, by making visible the politics behind it, only 
by resisting the lure of acceptable narratives, via unexpected translations of 
revolutionary lexicon to human rights discourses.
NOTES
1. Most of the work of the association and its structure can be seen from 
http://en.ihd.org.tr/. Unfortunately, the bulletins that are the main 
material of this chapter are not digitalized and published only in Turkish. 
All translations in this chapter are mine.
2. For more information on the results of this meeting, see Amnesty 
International Report. 1992. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/
documents/pol10/0001/1992/en/.
3. Steven L. Robins (2008, p. 2), in the South African context focusing on 
the struggle between the emancipatory politics and rights speech over the 
same period of time, states that “[r]adical keywords and concepts such as 
socialism, national liberation, class struggle, people’s revolution, resistance 
to racial capitalism and colonialism-of-a-special type, were replaced with 
tamer words such as rights, citizenship, liberal democracy, nation-building, 
transformation, black economic empowerment (BEE) and so on.”
4. Some of the seminal works are Costas Douzinas (2007), Human Rights 
and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, Samuel Moyns 
(2012), The Last Utopia, and Wendy Brown (1995) States of Injury.
5. Some relevant examples of literature on the human rights and the Third 
World are Upendra Baxi (2006) The Future of Human Rights, José-Manuel 
Barreto (2013) Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, 
History and International Law, Martti Koskenniemi, “Colonization of the 
‘Indies’: The Origin of International Law?” in La idea de América en el 




(Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, 2010) and “Empire and 
International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution,” University of Toronto 
Law Journal 61 (2011), and also Arturo Escobar, “Imperial Globality and 
Anti-Globalisation Movements,” Third World Quarterly 25 (2004): 210.
6. Statute of Amnesty International is amended by the 20th International 
Council meeting in Yokohama, Japan, August 31–September 7, 1991, and 
defined a mandate that is for either the promotion of certain goals or 
opposition to certain practices. The points raised in this press release found 
place in the mandate of AI.
7. The number is approximate and taken from the Parliamentary Research 
Committee Report, Cilt 2, September 2012. See also Info-Turk, Monthly 
Bulletin, October 1988, and Kayasu v Turkey, no. 64119/00, ECHR 
2008.
8. For information about hunger strikes before held by Kurdish indepen-
dence movement particularly. See: Bargu, B. (2014). Stave and Immolate, 
Colombia Unıversity Press, New York.
9. For a full list of hunger strikes and death fasts in this period, Ertugrul 
Mavioglu Asılmayip da Beslenenler: Bir Eylül Hesaplas ̧ması [Those Who 
Were Not Hanged but Fed: Settling Accounts with September 12]. 
Istanbul: Babil Yayinları, 2004. And Bargu, B. (2014). Stave and Immolate, 
Colombia Unıversity Press, New York.
10. Lois Whitman (1989, p. 114) states “The group has been indicted ten 
times, charged with violations of the Associations Law because of its press 
conferences, statements and conferences. (…) In 1987, for example, a case 
was brought against 18 TAYAD directors in connection with a demonstra-
tion in front of Sagmalcilar Prison.”
11. This is the expression used by Hüsnü Öndül, Akademi Notları, presented 
in the Human Rights Academy Diyarbakır Branch seminars, 2016. 
Available at: http://www.ihd.org.tr/akademi-egitim-notlari-dort-insan-
haklari-konusu/. Accessed Dec 18, 2017.
12. Thousands of people gathered for IHD’s first meetings in Istanbul, 
Diyarbakir and Izmir, and this mobilization was directed toward the goals 
of ending torture, calling for a general political amnesty and the abolition 
of death penalty (IHD. 2008). For more information see “History of 
Human Rights Association (IHD).” Available at: http://en.ihd.org.tr/
index.php/2008/12/08/history-of-human-rights-association-ihd/. 
Accessed Dec 18, 2017.
13. The bulletin has been published whenever possible, commonly two or 
more each year. Also, there was a special edition for Yokohama debates in 
this period.
14. Drawing borders of ‘Western human rights discourses’ is always difficult, 
given that, as this chapter tries to show, there is a constant translation and 
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(re)appropriation of human rights discourses between actors and institu-
tions. I follow definition and descriptions of José-Manuel Barreto (2013). 
He highlights “the Eurocentric theory of human rights presents itself as 
objective and universal and, while it assumes exclusive authority and legiti-
macy, it condemns a Third World approach to impossibility or silence. […] 
This predisposition is accompanied by a tendency to give a notorious and 
unfair weight to the events occurring in Europe. This is the case in Hegel’s 
philosophical notion of “universal history,” from which Asia, Africa and 
the Americas are excluded. By framing human rights in conceptions of his-
tory based exclusively on European milestones the theory of rights remains 
within a Eurocentric horizon of understanding. Having been born out of 
the experience of bourgeois revolutions, European theories of human 
rights deal mainly with relations between state and society, or between 
governments and individuals, putting aside the problematic of interactions 
between empires and colonies.” In this sense, what ‘Western’ corresponds 
is not necessarily geographical, but about narrations of history, universals 
and eventually power.
15. Fırst publication of the Yokohama Declaration was in the IHD Bülteni 
(Bulletin of Human Rights Association). 1993. Sayı 49–50.
16. Kanar makes reference to a general dogmatism of the left, rather than any 
particular one.
17. Bulletin of Human Rights Association, 1994, pp. 56–57.
18. Arturo Escobar (2011) in Encountering Development, on the notion of 
development underlines, “Perhaps no other idea has been so insidious, no 
other idea gone so unchallenged.”
19. How to define the actions of armed groups (human rights abuses, or 
breaches of local or international criminal law) is an important and relevant 
discussion (Dudai and Mcevoy 2012).
20. For an application of how the ethical turn has been reflected to transitional 
justice processes see Robert Meister (2011).
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Düşündürdükleri. IHD Bülteni, Sayı 49–50.
———. 1994. Sorun tek bas ̧ına Yokohama bildirgesi mi, yoksa insan hakları müc-
adelesinin uzun erekli kendine özgü politikalarının gereklilig ̆i sorunu mu? IHD 
Bülteni, Sayı 56–57.
———. 1997. Insan Haklari Mucadelesinde Insan Haklari Dernegi, Insan Haklari 
Yazilari. Ozel Sayi 1: 3–15.
Kennedy, David. 2006. Of War and Law. Princeton: Princeton Press.
 POLITICS OF NEUTRALITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED STRUGGLES… 
spaquero@uottawa.ca
98 
Kogod Goldman, R. 1993. International Humanitarian Law: Americas Watch’s 
Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts. American University 
Journal of International Law and Policy 9 (1): 49–94.
Koskenniemi, Martti. 2010. Colonization of the ‘Indies’: The Origin of 
International Law? In La idea de América en el Pensamiento Ius Internacionalista 
del Siglo XXI, ed. Yolanda Gamarra. Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el 
Católico.
———. 2011. Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution. 
University of Toronto Law Journal 61: 1–36.
Mavioglu, Ertugrul. 2014. Asılmayip da Beslenenler: Bir Eylül Hesaplas ̧ması. Babil 
Yayinları: Istanbul.
Mbembé, J.-A. 2003. Necropolitics. Trans. Libby Meintjes. Public Culture 15 (1): 
11–40 https://muse.jhu.edu/. Accessed 3 Apr 2018.
Meister, Robert. 2011. After Evil: A Politics of Human Rights. New  York: 
Colombia University Press.
Moyn, Samuel. 2012. The Last Utopia. Cambridge: Belknap Press/Harvard 
University Press.
Mutua, Makau W. 2001. Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human 
Rights. Harvard International Law Review 42 (1): 201–245.
Öndül, Hüsnü. 2017. Akademi Eg ̆itim Notları: Dört Iṅsan Hakları Konusu. 
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